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EFFORTPOST Texarkansas Train Derailment & Explosion (Write Up) (Remastered)


Interview With Officer:


Incident:

At 4:56 a.m., central daylight time, on October 15, 2005, westbound Union Pacific Railroad (UP) train ZYCLD 132 collided with the rear of standing UP train MPBHG 15 in the UP rail yard in Texarkana, Arkansas.

The collision resulted in the puncture of a railroad tank car containing propylene, a compressed flammable gas. The propylene was heavier than air and flowed near the ground into a nearby neighborhood. The flowing gas reached a house where an unknown ignition source ignited the gas, and the house exploded.

The single occupant was killed. The fire moved quickly along the flowing gas back to the punctured tank car. A second, unoccupied, home was destroyed in the fire, and a wooden railroad trestle burned completely. Approximately 3,000 residents within a 1-mile radius of the punctured tank car were advised to evacuate the area. The two crews and the employees working at the Texarkana yard were not injured, and they evacuated the area safely. Between 5:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., the wind was calm, the visibility was 10 miles, and the temperature was approximately 59° F. Total damage was $2.4 million, including $325,975 in equipment damage and $2,053,198 in track damage. The engineer and the conductor of train ZYCLD were scheduled to go on duty at 10:00 p.m. for a planned 260.9-mile trip from Pine Bluff, Arkansas, to Big Sandy, Texas. The crew was experienced over the territory.

The engineer and the conductor arrived at the Pine Bluff yard office at 9:45 p.m. and 9:50 p.m., respectively. They gathered the necessary paperwork for the trip, read the required notices, and conducted a safety briefing to discuss the trip. They were transported to their train at 11:00 p.m. The engineer performed an air test on the train, and the conductor checked the hand brakes. An employee from the mechanical department performed a successful air brake test on the train before the train departed at 11:34 p.m. The train consisted of 2 locomotive units and 57 loaded cars. The train was 5,598 feet long and weighed 3,961 tons. When train ZYCLD reached McNeil, Arkansas, 104.5 miles from Pine Bluff, the crew encountered a red signal, which was an indication that the train was following a train (MPBHG). The conductor told investigators that the trip was normal and the crew was not surprised to be following another train. The signal changed from red to yellow and then to flashing yellow. The train left McNeil on a flashing yellow signal, which meant that the train was at least two signal blocks behind the preceding train. At Stamps (two stations and 17.8 miles later), the crew encountered flashing yellow signals at both ends of the siding, meaning that they were still approximately two block signals behind the preceding train. At Lewisville (4.5 miles beyond Stamps) the crew observed a red signal that changed to yellow before the train had to stop. The signal at control point (CP) CB 414 (East Texarkana) remained red, and the crew said that they stopped the train and waited for a more favorable signal.

According to the electronic signal records from the dispatching system, this signal (CP CB 414) went from red to yellow about 4:13 a.m. and from yellow to flashing yellow about 4:24 a.m. The event recorder on the lead locomotive indicated that train ZYCLD started moving at 4:45 a.m., 21 minutes after the signal had changed to flashing yellow. When investigators asked the crew why they did not proceed when the signal changed from yellow to flashing yellow, the crew could not provide a reason. The crew said that they did not call anyone on the radio while the train was stopped, but they did have a personal conversation. UP rules allow napping by one crewmember when the train is stopped if the other crewmember stays awake. The conductor and the engineer said that they did not nap during that time. The crew reported having extensive conversations during the trip. The next signal that train ZYCLD encountered was at CP CB 416. The signal had displayed a yellow aspect since 4:24 a.m., and the train passed this signal at 4:51 a.m. When the train passed the Texarkana rail yard limits at milepost (MP) 416.4, its speed was approximately 19 mph, according to the event recorder.

The territory inside the yard limits was not controlled by the train dispatcher and did not have signals to indicate the presence of other trains. Within this territory, all trains were required to be operated at restricted speed. The engineer was controlling the train speed by using the power of the locomotives against the braking force applied on the cars of the train. He applied more braking at MP 416.77, at 18 mph with the engine at throttle 4. The train slowed to 17 mph; and at MP 417.02, the engineer increased to throttle 5. Between MP 417.02 and MP 417.51, the engineer sounded the horn for a grade crossing and maintained the train speed at 17 mph. At MP 417.86, train ZYCLD collided with the rear car of train MPBHG. After the collision, the event recorder showed the speed falling, a throttle reduction, a dynamic brake application, and an engineer-induced emergency brake application. While the crew had worked all night, and their circadian rhythms were at a low point when the collision occurred, the engineer was actively operating the train shortly before the accident. He had blown the whistle at a grade crossing approximately 1/3 mile (70 seconds) before the collision and controlled the train's speed by making brake and throttle adjustments only 1 mile before the collision. Further, during interviews, the crew told investigators that they had recognized a “dogleg” track configuration ahead of their train shortly before the point of impact. They both said that they had observed the standing train on their track with just enough time to brace themselves before impact. When train ZYCLD struck the rear car of train MPBHG, neither the locomotives nor the cars on train ZYCLD derailed. The forces of the striking train derailed the rear three cars on train ZYCLD derailed.

The forces of the striking train derailed the rear three cars of train MPBHG, but the cars remained upright. Then the forces were transmitted through the next 12 cars without derailing them. As a result of the collision, the 18th car was forced out of train MPBHG completely, and the 17th car continued forward until it struck the end of the 19th car (tank car TIMX 33429) and punctured the head of the tank car with its uncoupled coupler. (See Figure 2.) The tank car was loaded with liquefied propylene gas, and immediately after it was punctured, about half of its propylene load was released. The propylene tank car was equipped with a tank-head puncture-resistance system and jacketed thermal insulation. Performance standards for tank-head puncture-resistance systems are contained in 49 Code of Federal Regulations 179.16. The regulations require that a tank-head puncture-resistance system on a standing tank car be capable of sustaining, without any loss of lading, the impact from a coupler on a single freight car that weighs at least 263,000 pounds and is moving 18 mph. Train ZYCLD weighed more than 8.7 million pounds.

The propylene did not ignite immediately. Eyewitnesses said that after the collision they saw fog-like conditions near the track in the ditches and low points of the surrounding area. A local law enforcement officer stated that he saw a fog-like substance reach a residence, which then exploded. He then saw a bluish flame follow the groundlevel fog to the train, and then he saw another explosion near the derailed tank car.


Emergency Response:

At the time of the accident, the yardmaster and eight other persons were on duty in the Texarkana yard during the evening work shift. In addition to these nine yard employees, there was a two-member crew in each of the arriving trains, MPBHG and ZYCLD. Shortly after the 4:56 a.m. collision of the two trains, the crew of standing train MPBHG notified the yardmaster that their train had been struck.

About 5:00 a.m., the crew of the striking train advised the yardmaster that at least two cars at the rear of the train in front of them had derailed and were on the ground. The Texarkana, Arkansas, 911 communications center received several calls between 4:56 a.m. and 4:59 a.m. from residents complaining of a chemical odor adjacent to the Texarkana rail yard. The Texarkana 911 police dispatcher received the initial notification.

The Texarkana fire and police departments then dispatched units, and the Texarkana Office of Emergency Management was notified about 5:00 a.m. Within the next several minutes, a police unit responding to the initial complaint (in the area of Hobo Jungle Park, across the street from the accident) reported to the 911 police dispatcher a chemical smell and a white cloud drifting south. During this time, the 911 police dispatcher received additional calls from residents in the Hobo Jungle Park area complaining of breathing difficulties. As the responding fire units established the initial command post within 1/4 mile of the yard, they encountered several residents with respiratory complaints. About 5:04 a.m., the 911 police dispatcher contacted the UP yardmaster. The yardmaster told the dispatcher that at least two cars at the rear of a train had derailed and that they might contain vinyl acetate residue. The dispatcher told the yardmaster about reports of a chemical odor at the scene. Reading through the train consist, the yardmaster told the dispatcher that the 19th car from the end of train MPBHG was a tank car containing propylene, a flammable gas.

The yardmaster also told the dispatcher that he did not know whether the propylene tank car had derailed. He did not mention that the six cars ahead of the propylene tank car were also tank cars loaded with propylene.

>About 5:05 a.m., the yardmaster contacted the manager of rail operations for the Texarkana yard—the senior management official for the yard—and reported the derailment. In a subsequent call to the 911 police dispatcher, the yardmaster recommended a 1-mile evacuation radius. The yardmaster told investigators that he had recommended the 1-mile evacuation radius because it would afford the “best and safest course of action because of the multiple numbers of cars involved” and because his consist showed a chlorine tank car in train MPBHG that was a potential poison inhalation hazard. About 5:08 a.m., emergency response units reported a large explosion and a massive fireball at a house adjacent to Hobo Jungle Park. Immediately afterward, a police officer reported that flames roughly 3 feet high with a blue-colored base ran back across the park to the train, where a second explosion and similar fireball ignited. The residential electricity in Hobo Jungle Park went out as the surrounding area was engulfed in extremely heavy black smoke. All police and fire units withdrew and established a new command post. Immediately following the explosions, the manager of rail operations, by telephone, directed the yardmaster to evacuate all yard employees and the four train crewmembers to Wadley Regional Hospital. The manager of rail operations later stated that he had ordered the evacuation because of the size of the event and his desire to have all railroad employees at one location. The manager of rail operations also said he had known that at the hospital the crew of the striking train would be tested in accordance with Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) postaccident toxicology procedures. By 5:15 a.m. the fire department chief arrived at the new command post and assumed incident command. The chief noted at that time that the only information the 911 fire dispatcher had provided to the command post was that a “residue vinyl acetate tank car had derailed.” The chief and other responders did not yet know that propylene tank cars were on the train.

>By 5:20 a.m., the immediate area around the accident site, including Hobo Jungle Park, was evacuated. At 5:30 a.m., the emergency operations center established a 1-mile evacuation radius around the accident site. About 5:25 a.m., the manager of rail operations arrived at the scene. Without checking in with the incident commander, he went directly to the yard office to obtain a copy of the train consist for train MPBHG.

>At 5:28 a.m., the fire department operations chief requested the train consist from on-scene UP personnel. Shortly afterward, the incident command directed the 911 dispatcher to contact the yard to obtain the train consist. However, with the yard tower evacuated, the dispatcher was unable to contact any of the UP personnel at the yard. Working with the consist for train MPBHG, the manager of rail operations began a damage assessment of the yard. By 6:00 a.m., he had worked his way along train MPBHG from the head end and marked the printed train consist with the locations of the derailed cars. He told investigators that he had seen the propylene cars and determined that only one of them, car 19, was leaking and burning at one end. Once he completed his preliminary assessment of the yard and damages, he reported this information to UP headquarters. At 7:15 a.m., the Texarkana emergency operations center coordinator, the incident commander, and the operations chief finally received the yard copy of the consist at the command post. No other information or assistance in interpreting the consist, such as the derailed car numbers or the manager of rail operations' damage assessment, was provided by the UP, nor did the incident commander request additional information. When he received the consist, the fire department operations chief began to identify the tank cars containing hazardous materials that might be involved in the accident. Using binoculars and the train consist, he determined that the product in the burning tank car was propylene and that there were six additional loaded propylene tank cars.

>About 7:30 a.m., the fire department training chief and two firefighters (each using a self-contained breathing apparatus) entered the derailment site to assess the damage to all of the tank cars in the train, including the other six propylene tank cars. The training chief determined that there were no other leaks from any of the other cars. Upon completion of the fire department's damage assessment, the incident commander ordered a water monitor (to cool the burning tank car without extinguishing the propylene flare on the end of the car) and a master stream (to cool a 6-inch natural gas line beside a burning trestle). Other fire suppression activities included extinguishing fires involving two houses and a nearby highway wooden bridge and putting out grass fires along the tracks. Fire department personnel also searched the two burning homes for additional victims.

>About 10:30 a.m., the UP's contractor, the Center for Toxicology and Environmental Health, deployed air-monitoring equipment to evaluate the area surrounding the vinyl acetate tank cars. All readings later indicated that there were no leaks. Shortly afterward, additional UP contractors arrived, conducted a detailed assessment of the damaged tank cars, and developed a plan for removing those tank cars.

>At 1:30 p.m., the incident commander and all the parties agreed to dispose of the propylene in the punctured tank car by allowing it to burn in place.

>About 2:00 p.m., the incident commander reduced the evacuation zone to the immediate area at the site and allowed people to return to their homes.

>By 6:30 p.m., all fire suppression activities were completed; the propylene from the tank car was allowed to continue to burn.

>By 10:30 p.m., wreck-clearing equipment raised one end of car 19 to drain the remaining propylene from the tank car. After the drained propylene was burned off and the tank car fire was extinguished, the emergency was concluded about 12:00 a.m. on October 16, 2005.


Damage:

As a result of the collision, approximately 300 feet of track was disturbed. As a result of the fire, the railroad trestle was burned completely. Eight cars derailed on train MPBHG, one of which, a tank car, was destroyed. Four cars on the adjacent track maintenance train were also destroyed by the fire. Total equipment damage was $325,975, and track damage was $2,053,198. Two houses (one vacant), a shed, and a nearby highway bridge were also destroyed by explosion and fire. At least three highway vehicles that were parked near the tracks were burned completely. Fire destroyed the rear tires of a semitrailer parked near Hobo Jungle Park. The fire also burned approximately 4 acres of grass, brush, and trees.


Train:

Train ZYCLD originated in Chicago, Illinois, on October 13, 2005. The train received a Class I mechanical inspection and an initial terminal air brake test before departure. No mechanical defects were reported. The train received an additional Class I mechanical inspection and a Class IA 1,000-mile air brake inspection at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, on October 14, 2005. No mechanical defects were reported. Air brake leakage was recorded at 40 cubic feet per minute, which falls within the requirements of the FRA. No mechanical defects were reported during the trip from Pine Bluff to Texarkana. The locomotive engineer stated that the train had handled as anticipated during acceleration and deceleration.


Photos:

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17113823045359585.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/1711382304823004.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/1711382304915561.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17113823050422974.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17113823052417052.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17113823054578903.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17113823055725589.webp


NTSB reports:

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB0604.pdf

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A Russian major-general was killed and two troops were injured in Syria Tuesday after vehicles they were traveling in were hit by an improvised explosive device (IED), the Russian Ministry of Defence has announced.

The blast was said to have taken place near the At-Taim oil field, about 15 km outside the city of Deir ez-Zor, with the Russian convoy said to have been hit while returning from a humanitarian action.

“As a result of the explosion, three Russian servicemen were injured. During evacuation and while receiving medical assistant, a senior Russian military advisor with the rank of major-general died from the serious injuries sustained,” the MoD said.

The military said the IED involved was placed on the side of the road along which the Russian convoy was traveling.

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Dashcam footage of suicide bomb attack in Pakistan on 26th March, that claimed the lives of five Chinese engineers and two Pakistanis in Besham, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

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Suicide bombing at Kandahar bank kills at least 21 - March 21, 2024

Kandahar, Afghanistan

At least 21 people have been killed in a suicide bombing in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar, a hospital doctor has told the BBC.

The Taliban government says a suicide attack took place at a city centre bank at about 08:00 (03:30 GMT). It puts the death toll at three. Police said a number of others were wounded.

The Islаmic State (IS) group has claimed responsibility, and says it was targeting the Taliban. According to a report issued by IS's "news agency" Amaq, the group claimed the attacker detonated his suicide belt among the crowd of "around 150" Taliban members.

The blast, believed to be the biggest in Afghanistan this year, took place at a branch where Afghan government employees were queueing to collect their salaries.

A doctor from Mirwais hospital, the region's largest, spoke to the BBC on condition of anonymity. "So far 21 dead and at least 50 people injured from the explosion have been brought in," he said.

Kandahar is the seat of power of the Taliban, the base of their supreme commander.

While the overall security situation in Afghanistan has improved since the Taliban gained complete control with the full withdrawal of foreign troops in 2021, there continue to be dozens of bombings and suicide attacks in the country each year.

Many of them have targeted Afghanistan's Hazara ethnic minority and have been claimed by Islаmic State Khorasan Province, or ISKP, the regional affiliate of the so-called Islаmic State group, a major rival of the Taliban.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68625242

The bomber was from Tajikistan reportedly.

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Two people died from the explosion of acetylene gas-air mixture in the Khasavyurtovsky district of Dagestan. This is reported by the press service of the Investigative Committee of the Investigative Committee of Russia in Dagestan, writes TASS.

According to preliminary information of the investigation, two employees of the UZHKH came to perform technical work to a residential house, which is located in the Yubileyny settlement of Khasavyurt

"As a result of non-compliance with safety regulations, there was a clap of acetylene gas-air mixture in the sewer pipe, as a result of which both employees died," the report says.

According to the SHOT Telegram feed, one of the men threw a cigarette butt into the sewer. Investigators and emergency services went to the scene of the incident.

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CHILD WARNING Man blows himself up while setting up an explosive + aftermath

Ecuador: Extortion attempt goes fatally wrong as explosives detonate on suspect

In a shocking turn of events, an attempted extortion ended in a explosive death after an individual, suspected of trying to detonate an explosive device at a business in Guayaquil, Ecuador, found the device explode in his hands, resulting in his instant death. The entire incident was captured by a security camera.

The fatal event unfolded on Francisco de Orellana Avenue just before 11:00 p.m., where the accused culprit exited a red car and approached a commercial establishment, aiming to throw an explosive device.

The footage revealed the suspect handling what appeared to be dynamite, which unexpectedly detonated, causing his immediate demise. His companion in the red car hastily fled the scene.

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17107154849663594.webp

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17107154853988876.webp

The security camera footage vividly captured the outcome of the accused's actions. Reports from El Telegrafo suggested that the explosive used resembled mining dynamite, highlighting its significant power.

Earlier, the premises' owner had reportedly received extortion threats, leading to demands for payment to maintain peace. Although reports from El Universal indicated that the deceased suspect was a minor under 17 years old, identifying the body in its condition proved to be challenging

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They forget to throw the Grenade

Report if it's repost so I can delete it immediately :marseyconcerned:

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1:04 white van

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(Classic) Russian expert killed on live tv while defusing chechen bomb

Moscow, Russia - April, 2003

A Russian bomb disposal expert has been killed when a bomb he was trying to defuse by hand exploded in central Moscow.

Russian media report that a woman took the bomb into a crowded restaurant in a bag and threatened to blow it up, before it was seized from her.

Security officers failed to dispose of the device by remote control and it detonated when an officer was trying to defuse it manually.

The woman has been detained and is being investigated for possible links with Chechen suicide bombers who killed 14 people at an outdoor rock concert over the weekend.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2003-07-10/russian-expert-killed-defusing-bomb/1883606?pfmredir=sm&pfm=ms

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https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/1704059473991172.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17040594741639047.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17040594743524468.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17040594745775833.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17040594751766403.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17040594755898275.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17040594762710526.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17040594766722918.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17040594776741264.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17040594781517498.webp

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https://media.giphy.com/media/8wfoaIjVc0FBaLu5xH/giphy.webp

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no more info :marseycorner:

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Today 12/4/23 or for the rest of the world 4/12/23, a man being swatted (for shooting flares in a public park and firing random shots from a long barrel AR ) has filled his house with Natrual gas and upon the SWAT team forcibly entering his home detonated the natrual gas with either a shot from his AR or flare gun.

"As officers were attempting to execute a search warrant at the residence, the suspect discharged several rounds inside the home,” said ACPD. “Subsequently, an explosion occurred at the residence and officers continue to investigate the circumstances of the explosion." - ACPD

"A duplex where a suspect was involved in an ongoing incident with police exploded in a large fireball as police, including a SWAT armored vehicle, moved in. It followed the suspect repeatedly firing a flare gun over nearby Fields Park." - ARLNOW

As of right now no casualties have been reported besides the man inside of the house.

You can find updates here :

Aftermath of house :

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017439519304326.webp

Explosion (From a Distance):

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017439520381694.webp

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017439522415981.webp

UPDATED 12/5/23 or 5/12/23 -

Suspect name was James Yoo

Alex Wilson, the neighbor who took the video seen above — and shared worldwide on social media tonight — told ARLnow that the resident of the home was firing a rifle at police as they used the SWAT vehicle to try to get inside.

“When they rammed the front door he started firing an AR back at them,” he said. Wilson said he saw at least one officer injured following the explosion.

“He was able to walk but he was like holding his head,” said Wilson.

A man named James Yoo, listed in public records as the resident of the address to which police were initially dispatched, has been repeatedly posting paranoid screeds on his Linkedin account. One post from three days ago rants against his neighbors in the adjoining duplex unit.

Wilson — the neighbor who took the video of the explosion from his roof — described Yoo as a recluse and said he had aluminum foil covering the windows.

After the home was listed for sale a couple of years ago, Yoo chased would-be buyers off with a knife, according to Wilson. Real estate records show the home was taken off the market on at the end of 2021.

As a commenter has made me aware @Flatline_Miami he has a YouTube account where he posts paranoid content. As of right now no deaths have been reported. Besides his own. (I think). His account is "James Yoo" if you would like more info on that.

ARLNOW has updated their page with more info on the situation.

Comment :

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017924252905319.webp

His youtube :

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017928323428314.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017928324410012.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017928325490317.webp

More explosion pictures :

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017928326609159.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017928327979798.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17017928329151084.webp

As more comments have made me aware these posts also belonged to James Yoo :

https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17018877821373792.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17018877823621633.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17018877825651567.webp https://i.watchpeopledie.tv/images/17018877827547386.webp

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Car blows up while a guy films it, very scary 😱😱😱

Completely stole this shit from another gore website, even the title :chudspin:

(some retard reported the previous title)

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