The Battle of Cannae was a key engagement of the Second Punic War between the Roman Republic and Carthage, fought on 2 August 216 BC near the ancient village of Cannae in Apulia, southeast Italy.

It is regarded as one of the greatest tactical feats in military history and one of the worst defeats in Roman history, and it cemented Hannibal's reputation as one of antiquity's greatest tacticians.

Commanders and strength of both sides;

The Roman Army

Total Strength; 86,400 Men

Light Infantry

15,000 Velites

Infantry

≈25,000 Roman

≈30,000 Allied

Cavalry

2,400 Roman

4,000 Allied

Troops in Camp

10,000 Allied Infantry

Roman Commanders;

Gaius Terentius Varro

Lucius Aemilius Paullus

Servilius Geminus

The Army of Carthage

Total Strength; 50,000 Men

Light Infantry

6,000 Skirmishers

2,000 Balearic Slingers

Infantry

21,000 Gallic

3,000 Spanish

8,000 Libyan

Cavalry

4,000 Numidian

2,000 Spanish

4,000 Gallic

Carthagian Commanders;

Hannibal Barca

Mago Barca

Hasdrubal

Hanno

This is the story I wrote about the battle, based Polybius, who was a Greek historian. I just added more action to what happened according to him. Enjoy reading.

On a sweltering August 2nd, the battle standard in front of Varro's tent signalled to the troops to array for battle. As the gusts of south-westerly Volturnus wind raised clouds of fine dust across the dry Apulian soil, for the next several hours, army officers closely supervised the complex deployment to ensure that the legions would form in the correct order.

Varro, and the rest of the Roman leadership, decided to show the enemy their willingness to fight.

However, they had no way of knowing if the Carthaginians would accept a battle in this new location. But then... Hannibal led his troops through the gates...

The two armies crossed the river Aufidius at various points and marched onto the dust-blown flat plain below the town of Cannae.

Yet, the Romans still weren't sure that Hannibal would give battle, so they left a 10,000 strong garrison in the main camp. It was Paullus who insisted on this, arguing that, besides guarding the baggage, this force could also threaten Hannibal's camp and cut off his line of retreat once the battle went in favour of the Romans.

However, Hannibal wasted no time in deploying his army, sending out his light troops to form a protective screen for the main body.

Varro too sent out the Velites to mask the process of deployment from the enemy.

There are suggestions that the Roman leadership didn't actually expect the more mobile Carthaginians to fight on such a narrow and confined battlefield, and merely wanted to deploy the legions in front of the enemy to boost morale and rebuild their confidence, after being humiliated the day before for refusing to fight. Such practices of building up the confidence of the men were common in the battles of this period, but it is far more probable that the Romans did, in fact, fully intend to fight this battle on the ground of their own choosing.

Whatever the case, Hannibal is said to have had 40,000 infantry and 10,000 horse, while the Romans fielded around 70,000 infantry and 6,400 cavalry.

Varro placed a screen of around 15,000 velites in front of the main line. 4,000 allied horse were positioned on the left under his direct command, while Paullus was in charge of the 2,400 Roman cavalry deployed on the right. To compensate for their numerical inferiority, the squadrons of horsemen were packed in a tighter formation, with no more than 1.5m between each rider. Room to maneuver the horses wasn't necessary as their role would be purely defensive while the infantry drove the attack forward.

Regular Roman infantry was mixed with the cavalry to give more stability to the static squadrons.

Servilius commanded the 55,000 Roman legionaries and allied troops in the center, arrayed in a much deeper and more tightly packed triplex acies. Varro used the overstrength maniples to add depth to the infantry formations. Furthermore, he reduced the gaps between the lines to bring the full weight of the legions to bear, aiming to overwhelm the enemy.

He knew that, at the battle of Trasimene, the Roman heavy infantry held off the Carthaginians for hours, inflicting significant losses, despite being in an unfavourable position. And the year prior to that at Trebia, the legions hacked their way through the Carthaginian center, getting the better of both the Gauls and several contingents of Libyans, Hannibal's best infantry. It's worth noting that the tighter maniple formations restricted the tactical flexibility, but eased the coordination of the massive army and, more importantly, the deeper formations possessed longer endurance in a direct confrontation, thus the Roman leadership was confident that the legions can outmatch the enemy and crush Hannibal's center yet again.

To achieve this Varro chose the battlefield wisely.

He packed the legions on a narrow front, with the river and the hills near Cannae protecting the flanks from envelopment. This would force the Carthaginian horsemen into a frontal charge and the Roman cavalry was tasked with delaying long enough for the legions to finish the job. If they could break through the Punic center, it wouldn't matter if the weaker Roman horse lost the fight on the wings, because at that point the Carthaginian cavalry couldn't do much more than harass the large block of legions.

The selection of the battleground at Cannae could allow the heavy infantry to smash their Punic enemy. The Roman plan was simple, but efficient.

Meanwhile, Hannibal placed around 6,000 Spanish skirmishers and up to 2000 renowned Balearic slingers as a screening force in front of the army, instructing them to raise as much dust as possible to hide the disposition of the troops. Behind them formed the close order infantry, with 21,000 Gallic warriors making up the bulk of the main line. 3,000 veteran Spanish infantry were interspersed to strengthen the center.

But, unlike at Trebia, where his main line collapsed because he amassed all of his infantry to try and match the Romans and didn't keep any reserves for decisive action and to plug the gaps in the line, this time he positioned the 8,000 Libyans, his best, most disciplined men, in the rear, hiding them from view behind the formations in the front.

On the Punic right were 4,000 Numidian horsemen, commanded by Hanno, tasked with holding the flank, while on the opposite side the Carthaginian general placed 2,000 Spanish and 4,000 Gallic cavalry, under the command of Hasdrubal, planning to overload the left flank in a direct attack on the Roman right, hoping to smash the enemy cavalry and threaten the legions from the rear.

Neither side was intimidated by the other. Gallic and Spanish troops had the confidence of past victories against the legions, while the Romans trusted in their superior numbers, remembering that even in prior defeats, their heavy infantry often prevailed in hand to hand combat against the Punic troops.

Then… around mid-day, like a lumbering beast, the Roman formation moved forward!

The Carthaginian cavalry on the left led the line, trotting at pace, while the light infantry of both armies moved ahead of the main lines to open the engagement.

Now, hidden behind the dust raised by the screen of skirmishers, Hannibal made his move, advancing with the main line to form a crescent formation that would bulge towards the enemy.

He understood that the Romans chose this narrow battlefield to deploy their army as a battering ram and that his outnumbered infantry stood no chance of stopping the legions if they tried matching them man for man. Therefore, the bulged line was supposed to absorb the attack and then slowly retreat, to buy time until the cavalry attack on the left unfolded.

Hannibal personally commanded the troops in the center, with the help of his youngest brother Mago, for these troops would bear the brunt of the Roman assault and it was vital that they held out as long as possible.

As the skirmishing between the light troops began in the middle of the field, Carthaginian riders on the left advanced full tilt towards the Roman citizen-cavalry. With veteran officers leading the way, the Spanish and Gallic squadrons stayed compact, doubling up on and dispersing the first lines of Roman horsemen, quickly penetrating their formation. Some of the Roman riders dismounted to fight on foot, but the Carthaginians swarmed their positions, dragging their opponents from their seats.

But despite outnumbering the Romans 3 to 1, the confined space largely negated the numerical advantage of the Punic riders and Hasdrubal did well to tightly control his men, managing to overwhelm the Romans in a brief furious charge. The Roman cavalry couldn't cope and most of them broke and fled, with the Carthaginians now in hot pursuit. Others huddled together to hold off the Punic onslaught for as long as possible.

Paullus himself escaped the carnage with his retinue and moved to rejoin the fighting in the center.

Meanwhile, on the opposite flank, the Numidians pinned down the allied Italian cavalry with hit and run attacks, with neither side able to gain an advantage.

In the center, after a long exchange of projectiles, the skirmishers retreated behind the close order infantry as the Roman legions closed in. The massed ranks of legionaries must've been an intimidating sight, advancing slowly while clashing their weapons against the wooden shields, whilst the trumpeters added to the cacophony of noise. As an almost solid mass of rank upon rank of armoured legionaries clashed with the enemy, Hannibal's advanced center narrowed the width of the initial contact, reducing the deadly momentum of the Roman attack.

The bare chested Gauls, hacking at the enemy with their long slashing swords, and the Spanish in their white tunics, thrusting forward with their short blades, stood firm and held back the enemy for a time, but as more Roman troops entered the fray, the weight of the legions drove back the mixed Punic formation.

Roman velites supported the attack, while the Carthaginian light footmen were ordered to reinforce the flanks of the infantry.

Hannibal and his officers barked orders at the men, telling them to stand off the Roman assault and slowly move back!

Already overwhelmed by the wall of scutum shields pushing them back, ordering the troops to retreat further in the face of the enemy was fraught with risks. All it would take is a few men buckling under pressure to cause slight cracks in the line that could quickly break the formation and turn into a rout.

But the Carthaginian general and his Punic captains led from the front, fighting alongside the troops in the first lines, encouraging the men to hold their nerve, carefully controlling their withdrawal! Hannibal knew that he had to stay in the fight and buy time until events elsewhere on the field unfolded. And for now, the line held…

Close to the hills on the right, the light Numidian horsemen fought in small groups, throwing their javelins and rapidly retreating before the enemy could pin them down. However, their attacks caused very little damage, and Varro simply remained in place, making no effort to drive them back.

The main role of the Roman cavalry was to prevent the enemy from flanking the infantry formation long enough, until the main assault of the legions broke through the center.

But, on the other flank, the superior Carthaginian horse have by now decimated the Roman cavalry, completely routing them from the field.

Next, Hasdrubal could move against the rear of the Roman center or help surround Varro's allied cavalry on the right. But first, he had to regroup and allow his men and horses time to rest, who were by now exhausted from pursuing the fleeing enemy cavalry.

Back in the center, as the Carthaginian infantry fell back before them, the Romans pressed on, prodding and cutting through the retreating enemy line. Sword in hand, the centurions and tribunes shouted orders through the deafening noise of the screams and the clattering of weapons, urging the maniples to charge together, sending more and more men into the concaved Punic center, which seemed like it will soon break.

Conversely, Hannibal and Mago pushed the men to resist a while longer, trying to gain every precious second, hoping that the Spanish and Gallic cavalry will come to their aid.

But as more and more legionaries were drawn inwards, the Roman breakthrough was inevitable and the pressure on the center finally broke the Punic line!

The Gauls and Spanish at first moved back facing the enemy, with flurries of fighting still occurring, but before long they turned and routed.

With the enemy now on the run, Paullus and Servilius poured more men into the gap, refusing to give the Carthaginians any chance to rally and reform their lines.

The overcrowded Roman center surged forward into the salient!

Hannibal's infantry on either side of the gaping hole managed to maintain their lines, but were nevertheless forced to retreat in good order.

Meanwhile, up the field, Hasdrubal had reformed his cavalry squadrons and charged at Varro's formation, realizing that he could not move against the legions in the center before the threat of Roman cavalry was removed.

Until now, Varro successfully held the flank, but seeing the incoming Carthaginians, the Consul knew that the Roman cavalry on the other wing must've routed, and he could not see what was going on in the center. Unsure if the day was lost and facing annihilation himself against a force three times his own, Varro fled the field.

The Numidians gave chase, while Hasdrubal once again had to stop to rest and reform his cavalry, before he could turn them towards the rear of the Roman infantry.

Back in the center, legionaries in their tens of thousands pressed forward to complete the rout of the enemy. As they advanced into the gap, the maniples lost all cohesion, turning into a disorganized mob that rushed forward, with their officers barely able to control small groups of men in their own immediate vicinity.

This mattered little, however, as the Romans could taste victory, having punched straight through the enemy's center.

Hannibal relied on trickery and ruse in his prior victories, but it now seemed that the clear field at Cannae offered no possibility for him to set up an ambush.

But… as the mass of Romans streamed forward, they found themselves between the columns of Libyan infantry, that moved against the pursuing troops.

Incredibly, the Carthaginian general outwitted the Romans, yet again. By carefully masking the position of the Libyans behind his troops in the front and using the clouds of dust raised by the fighting, Hannibal concealed his best infantry from the enemy on an open field , luring the greatest army Rome has ever assembled into an ambush set in plain view, in effect letting the legions outflank themselves.

As the Libyans pressed the overextended and disorganized mass on both sides, the momentum of the Roman attack dissolved and the troops were no longer under anyone's control.

Hannibal and Mago rallied most of the routing Gallic and Spanish troops, turning to rejoin the fighting, while on the opposite side of the field, Hasdrubal charged into the rear of the enemy infantry.

As the compression of the legions began, the utter defeat of the Roman army was now inevitable. With the maniples hopelessly intermingled, they could no longer reform their lines. To make matters worse, Libyan troops looked similar to Roman legionaries, having been equipped with Roman armour, helmets and shields, that they stripped from the dead at Trebia, Trasimene, and Geronium.

The legionaries felt they were no longer protected on the flanks, and with the enemy seemingly amongst them, their nervousness soon turned to panic. Hannibal turned the strength of the Roman infantry, their deep overwhelming formation, against them.

As their ranks contracted under the pressure of multiple attacks, centurions and tribunes tried in vain to improvise, as movement became ever harder in the confined space.

Paullus and Servilius fought heroically, leading a stiff resistance, but both were eventually cut down during the fighting.

Small groups of legionaries tried forming rough formations, but most were too exhausted and stood no chance against the fresh Libyans who were kept in reserve for most of the day. Some of the Roman troops, weary and fatigued, simply gave up, no longer having the strength to raise their weapons.

As the hours passed, the battle became a one-sided massacre.

The fighting went on until dark, but there was little to no tactical sophistication in this final stage of the battle, as the Carthaginians systematically slaughtered most of the trapped infantry.

In the end, widespread Roman resistance collapsed and those who had any strength left in them managed to flee towards the Roman camps and the nearby towns.

Hannibal had won an unbelievable victory!

By sundown, some 50,000 Roman infantry and 2,700 cavalry lay dead or dying on the field at Cannae. The gory sight gave pause even to the most hardened of observers, as nearly 3,000 tonnes of human flesh was left to rot in the August sun – the true fruits of Hannibal's tactical masterpiece.

But, achieving this slaughter cost Hannibal dearly. 5,700 of his men fell, a high figure for a victorious army in ancient times, which is testament to the harsh fighting on the day, although it is worth noting that the Carthaginians were significantly outnumbered until the very end of the battle, which also played a role in the relatively high casualties for Hannibal's army.

Nevertheless, the Roman leadership was decimated. Consul Paullus, proconsul Servilius, and Marcus Minucius Rufus were killed in the battle, along with 80 senators, two quaestors, 29 out of 48 military tribunes, some 300 equestrians, with many others captured and enslaved.

Never has there been a defeat that struck so hard at the very heart of Roman society.

And… as night fell on August 2nd, 216 BC, Rome's very future was left in doubt.